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SHOWCASING: THE POSITIVE SPIN*
KATHARINE T. BARTLETT**
This Commentary outlines the positive case for showcasing diversity.
Patrick Shin and Mitu Gulati criticize showcasing on the grounds that
appointing women and minorities to board directorships is unreliable
as a sign of true commitment to diversity and, further, that showcasing
is detrimental to women and minorities because it treats them as objects
or “prized trophies.” Drawing on social psychology, this Commentary
highlights the mechanisms through which showcasing, despite the
negative features emphasized by Shin and Gulati, also reinforces
diversity values and strengthens the existing societal consensus in favor
of diversity.
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INTRODUCTION
What do companies signal when they showcase female and
minority members of their corporate boards? Not necessarily more,
say Patrick Shin and Mitu Gulati, than that they understand that
diversity is a socially significant issue, and that they can attract
members of the showcased individual’s minority group, against whom
they are then probably disinclined to discriminate.1 While this may be
important information to convey, Shin and Gulati’s focus is on what is
not reliably signaled by the showcasing of women and minority
appointments. Specifically, they argue that showcasing is not a true
indication that the company has achieved diversity, or even that it has
* © 2011 Katharine T. Bartlett.
** A. Kenneth Pye Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
1. Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1017, 1032,
1034–35 (2011).
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a commitment to achieving it.2 It is not a true indication because
showcasing is too cheap and easy in relation to the more difficult
work necessary to achieve genuine diversity.3 Thus, while token board
appointments can appear to reflect a deeper commitment to diversity,
they actually predict little about whether a company has made that
commitment.4
Showcasing may not warrant as much credit to the companies
who engage in it as they may seek, but does it do any harm? Yes, say
Shin and Gulati. Showcasing women and minorities for their value as
signals treats them as “prized troph[ies]” or “passive emblems.”5 This
treatment is dehumanizing and “corrosive to their status in the
organizational community.”6 It also reinforces stereotypes that
women and minorities lack merit for top-level corporate positions.7
Shin and Gulati are careful to say that their concerns are not
about showcasing per se, but rather about showcasing for the purpose
of signaling a commitment to diversity,8 which they believe “implies a
morally offensive way of thinking about the value of diversityoriented hiring or promotional practices.”9 Accordingly, this
Commentary responds to that single, limited matter: whether it is
acceptable and appropriate for companies to showcase female and
minority board appointments for signaling purposes. While the
response acknowledges the validity of some of Shin and Gulati’s
concerns, it focuses on the shinier side of the showcasing coin. In
particular, it argues that showcasing has the potential to strengthen a
positive societal view of diversity, even when it does not predictably
signal a genuine commitment to that diversity.
Part I spells out this positive case for showcasing. This case starts
with the assumption that companies who make diversity
appointments and then advertise them must believe that others view
diversity favorably and thus will think well of them if they engage in
it. Showcasing not only exploits this favorable view of diversity, but
also furthers people’s internalization of this view and their
commitment to act consistently with it.
2. Id. at 1032.
3. Id. at 1034–35.
4. Id. at 1025–26, 1034–35; see also Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec,
Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 451–52
(2008) (arguing that board diversity is easy to mimic and thus has little signaling value).
5. Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1040–41.
6. Id. at 1040.
7. Id. at 1041 n.60.
8. Id. at 1043.
9. Id.
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Part II then examines the positive case for the appointment of
women and minorities to corporate boards. It begins with a discussion
of the two principle rationales typically used to justify identityconscious appointments: nondiscrimination and diversity. Drawing on
how these rationales have functioned to bolster the case for diversity
within juries and among judges, Part II briefly explores their benefits
and limitations, and notes the mixed empirical evidence that underlies
them. It concludes by retrieving a rationale mentioned in passing by
Shin and Gulati—that actions to promote diversity serve the purpose
of expressing an important societal ideal.10 The commitment to
corporate board diversity (and diversity in other domains) is hard to
explain without this expressive rationale, which does not depend
upon empirical evidence that diversity achieves other instrumental
goals. Part III connects the positive case for showcasing to this
expressive function.
I. THE CASE FOR SHOWCASING
Shin and Gulati’s thesis is that company showcasing of female
and minority board appointments is misleading as a signal of a
genuine commitment to diversity and has hidden costs to the women
and minorities who are showcased. This two-part account is plausible,
as far as it goes, but it does not do justice to the positive potential
benefits of showcasing for strengthening nondiscrimination and
diversity norms. For one thing, it ignores these possible benefits. For
another thing, it reflects a cynicism that has the potential to weaken
the diversity ideal it seeks to uphold. Shin and Gulati criticize
showcasing motivated by a desire to signal because it “undercuts the
basic premise that animates the evidential view of the value of
diversity.”11 Ironically, their thesis that signaling is corrupting has the
quality of a self-fulfilling prophecy, which may itself undercut the
commitment that diversity requires.
This Part examines the positive benefits neglected in the Shin
and Gulati account. It argues that expression matters. The expression
of positive views about a subject has the potential to reinforce those
positive views both among the people expressing the views and their
audiences. Showcasing diversity appointments expresses a prodiversity point of view, and thereby, under the right conditions,
enhances a pro-diversity norm. Similarly, showcasing is also an action
that reinforces the underlying commitments upon which it is based.
10. Id. at 1020–21.
11. Id. at 1041.
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A. Expression Matters
In their critique of showcasing as a signal of commitment to
diversity, Shin and Gulati are concerned that some people will
mistakenly overread the showcasing signal and attribute more credit
to a company than its actual commitment warrants. This concern
needs to be put in the broader context of business communication,
through which all companies seek to portray themselves or their
products in as good a light as they reasonably can, often through
subliminal messages. Philip Morris advertisements build the Marlboro
brand with athletic, sexy, masculine figures in the great, clean
outdoors.12 BP Oil narrates stories of local New Orleans workers to
convey the message that it will take care of the damage caused by the
Deepwater Horizon explosion (even as it seeks other parties with
whom to share responsibility for that damage).13 Similarly, when
companies draw attention to their “diverse” board appointments,
they are hoping to create favorable associations between the
company and its commitment to diversity. Like other forms of
business promotion and advertising, bringing these appointments to
the attention of others plays on people’s subliminal receptivity and
gullibility. “Puffery,” however, is generally tolerated in the business
world, particularly with respect to claims that are highly subjective
and hard to disprove.14
Shin and Gulati argue that one reason diversity cannot be
reliably signaled by diversity appointments is that the concept of
diversity is indeterminate, contextual, and subjective.15 But they
appear to miss the full implications of this observation. Preliminarily,
because of the subjectivity and indeterminacy of diversity, a company
that makes diversity appointments could readily perceive itself to be
12. See, e.g., Marlboro Man, STANFORD UNIV.: THE BILL LANE CTR. FOR THE AM.
W., http://west.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/pager.php?id=33 (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
13. See Gulf of Mexico Response, BP, http://www.bp.com/extendedsection
genericarticle.do?categoryId=40&contentId=7061813 (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
14. See, e.g., New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Fla., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d
195, 235 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding as puffery a gun manufacturer’s claim that the Model P
handgun was the “gun that won the west”); Thompson Med. Co. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 643
F. Supp. 1190, 1199–1200 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that weight-loss pill manufacturer’s
representations that the pill would cause you to “Lose Weight Fast” was puffery and not
misleading); In re Dannon Milk Prods., Inc., 61 F.T.C. 840, 841 (1962) (holding as
meaningless puff Dannon’s claim that its yogurt is “nature’s perfect food”); Gold v. Univ.
of Bridgeport Sch. of Law, 562 A.2d 570, 572–73 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that the
law school’s advertising to prospective students of opportunities for “friendly interaction”
with faculty was “akin to mere ‘puffing’ ” and could not support liability for fraudulent
misrepresentation).
15. Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1027–31.
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committed to diversity, according to its own (probably vague,
indeterminate, and also self-serving) understanding of that term. In
other words, just as there is little objective sense in which it could be
said that a company has committed to, or accomplished, diversity, so
also there is little meaningful sense in which a company can be said to
misrepresent its commitment to diversity when it draws attention to
its women and minority board members.
More importantly, Shin and Gulati ignore the potential for the
continual redefinition and evolution that the elasticity of diversity
allows. Elasticity means opportunity. Those who engage in efforts to
achieve diversity, or to advertise those efforts, participate in shaping
the meaning of diversity and the attitudes others should have toward
it. Thus, when companies signal a commitment to diversity to further
their reputation, they also signal that diversity is a positive ideal.
People assume that companies exist to make a profit and take actions
to serve their own best interests. They therefore also assume that
when companies are willing to put their reputations behind diversity
appointments, these companies must believe that diversity is an
affirmative, worthwhile ideal—a belief that might, in turn, influence
their own attitudes about diversity.
The enhancement of people’s positive attitudes and commitment
toward diversity is critical to their willingness and ability to avoid the
kinds of discrimination that are now most common in this society.
Advancing any societal goal is made easier by people’s commitment
to that goal.16 Buy-in is especially important, however, in spheres of
behavior that the state cannot directly measure, monitor, or control.17
Most people, out of fear of getting caught and paying the price, are
likely to refrain from running red lights, stealing from others, and
torching property for which they hold under-water mortgages. In
contrast, there are important social goals that the state cannot readily
enforce—for example, the goal that parents provide to their children

16. See Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The “What” and “Why” of Goal
Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior, 11 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY
227, 241 (2000) (citing studies showing that people do better in protecting the environment
and overcoming alcohol and drug addiction when they are internally motivated to do so);
Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of
Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 68, 73
(2000) (citing studies showing that people do better at losing weight, taking medications,
and engaging in school or personal relationships when they are internally motivated to do
so).
17. On the importance of alternatives to state coercion as a means of obtaining
compliance with the law’s desired goals, see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE
LAW 22–23 (1990).
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good discipline, moral guidance, intellectual stimulation, and love. As
to these matters, the state is largely dependent upon other sources of
motivation. Social norms reinforced by family, friends, church, and
even popular culture are the most likely sources of parenting norms.18
The state relies on the internalization of these norms when it leaves
the important job of raising children up to parents.19
Because, as Shin and Gulati note, diversity is a difficult ideal to
define, legally mandate, and monitor,20 coercion is not likely to
accomplish it; as with good parenting, its achievement depends upon
positive social norms and people’s voluntary and internalized
commitment to those norms. Laws and employment policies can deter
supervisors from blatantly treating women and minorities worse than
other employees, and they can protect employees from the most
egregious forms of harassment based on sex or race.21 Today,
however, discrimination rarely occurs as explicitly and blatantly as it
did in the early reported Title VII cases.22 More often, it takes the
form of harmful, stereotype-based processing errors that are not easy
to discern, even by those who make those errors. For example, people
tend to form initial impressions of others based on unconscious
stereotypes about them and then unconsciously remember, organize,
and evaluate subsequent information based on these same biased
impressions.23 They believe their evaluations are objective, even when
their unconscious biases have infected their evaluative judgments.24
Discrimination also takes the form of various types of involuntary
18. For basic works on the importance of social norms as an alternative or supplement
to legal norms, see generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development,
and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of
Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000); Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
19. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
49–52 (1973) (arguing that the law cannot supervise interpersonal relationships including
the parent-child relationship); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood,
98 YALE L.J. 293, 301–02 (1988) (arguing that good parenting depends upon the “capacity
[for] moral decision making” and responsibility, which the law undermines when it tries
too hard to control parental behavior).
20. See Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1027–31.
21. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of
Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1956
(2009).
22. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337–38 (1977);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426–28 (1971).
23. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1167, 1209, 1213 (1995).
24. Id. at 1214.
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behaviors, like “lack of eye contact and warmth, tensing of facial
muscles, increased blinking, anxious voice tone, . . . and [the]
maintenance of physical distance and formality.”25 These responses,
too, negatively affect the working conditions of members of some
groups and their ability to perform their jobs.26 Yet they are also
usually unintended and thus difficult for the law itself to curtail.27 To
combat these types of behaviors, people must be motivated to selfmonitor, pursuant to nondiscrimination norms that they have deeply
internalized.28
The appointment of women and minorities to positions of
influence is one among an array of social influences that can help
facilitate the internalization of nondiscrimination and diversity values.
Research in a variety of settings suggests that the presence of female
and minority leadership positions operates indirectly to reduce
implicit bias.29 Positive role models help to dispel the assumption that
25. Bartlett, supra note 21, at 1896–97 (citing sources); Jennifer Crocker et al., Social
Stigma, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 504, 513 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds.,
4th ed. 1998); John F. Dovidio et al., Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial
Interaction, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62, 63 (2002); Susan T. Fiske, What We
Know About the Problem of the Century: Lessons from Social Science to the Law, and
Back, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND
REALITIES 59, 60, 63 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005).
26. See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual
Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 805–
06 (1995) (discussing how subtle cues that remind ethnic minority students of their
stigmatized status undermine achievement on academic tests); Carl O. Word, The
Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial Interaction, 10 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 119 (1974) (showing how negative nonverbal
behaviors produce poorer performance in job interview setting among both whites and
blacks).
27. Indeed, as to behaviors grounded in unconscious attitudes, legal coercion may
even make the problem worse. See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 1936–41.
28. See id. at 1931–34.
29. For examples of research suggesting this proposition, see M. ELIZABETH
TIDBALL ET AL., TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY: LESSONS AND LEGACIES FOR
EDUCATING THE MAJORITY 77–78 (1999) (finding a strong link between frequency of
counterstereotypic female role models on campus and the students’ commitment to
counterstereotypic careers); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the
Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of
Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 806–07
(2001) (describing experimental research showing that exposure to admired black figures
and disliked white exemplars resulted in lower scores for implicit bias in comparison with
control subjects); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to
Counterstereotypic Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender
Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642, 653–54 (2004) (describing
research demonstrating that women who attended women’s colleges where they had
frequent contact with women faculty showed less automatic bias after one year than those
who attended coeducational institutions where the contact with women leaders was
relatively less frequent).
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members of some groups are not sufficiently qualified to take on
leadership roles, and they redefine expectations of whom people
expect to see in leadership roles.30 To have this positive effect it is
necessary to overcome the force of a phenomenon sometimes
referred to as “prototype subtyping,” whereby people view successful
women and minorities as exceptions to the general rule (the rule that
white men are more competent than others), rather than as a reason
to modify race or gender stereotypes they hold.31 But showcasing
helps to bring the kind of positive attention to diversity appointments
that addresses this phenomenon constructively. The higher the
position32 and the more examples people can easily retrieve of
competent women and minorities in positions of authority33—to
which, again, showcasing can help draw attention—the more effective
these counterstereotypes are likely to be in weakening the
stereotypes that such positions are beyond the ability of women and
minorities.34
A factor especially important to how people process and
internalize information about women and minorities is the perceived
30. See, e.g., Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note 29, at 653–54; see also infra notes 37–38
(citing studies confirming the importance of organizational leadership committed to
diversity).
31. Prototype subtyping is explained in Miles Hewstone, Contact and Categorization:
Social Psychological Interventions to Change Intergroup Relations, in STEREOTYPES AND
STEREOTYPING 323, 338–41 (C. Neil Macrae et al. eds., 1996).
32. One study, for example, links the rising prominence of now-President Barack
Obama during his presidential campaign with a significant decrease in implicit bias against
blacks. See generally E. Ashby Plant et al., The Obama Effect: Decreasing Implicit
Prejudice and Stereotyping, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 961 (2009).
33. Repeated exposure increases “construct accessibility,” which enables the
counterstereotypes to actually alter stereotypes. See E. Tory Higgins & Gillian King,
Accessibility of Social Constructs: Information-Processing Consequences of Individual and
Contextual Variability, in PERSONALITY, COGNITION, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 69, 71
(Nancy Cantor & John F. Kihlstrom eds., 1981); Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr.,
Category Accessibility and Social Perception: Some Implications for the Study of Person
Memory and Interpersonal Judgments, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 841, 851–52
(1980).
34. Direct contact between these women and minorities also, under the right
conditions, will help to break down barriers and reduce stereotypes. See Bartlett, supra
note 21, at 1953–55 (citing studies that demonstrate how equal status, common goals,
interdependence, and positive support in the workplace can cause “people to be less fixed
in their own views, and more careful about assessing new information and attitudes”);
Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, Allport’s Intergroup Contact Hypothesis: Its
History and Influence, in ON THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE: FIFTY YEARS AFTER
ALLPORT 262, 264–66 (John F. Dovidio et al. eds., 2005) (reviewing studies updating
Gordon Allport’s “contact hypothesis”); see also Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 981 (2006) (arguing, on the basis of empirical
studies, that implicit bias will be reduced as workers have more contact with people whom
they previously stereotyped).
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norms of others around them. A series of studies from the University
of Maryland suggest that subtle cues about peer racial attitudes
influence the attitudes of others, who unconsciously come to see
those attitudes as their own.35 This research involved college students,
who were influenced in their views about race and gender by subtle
cues from other students they did not know, in contexts in which they
were unlikely to meet again.36 On the basis of these studies, one
would expect that the perceived beliefs and attitudes of company
leaders, including workplace supervisors, officers, and other top-level
personnel, would be influential with respect to the norms people
absorb and make their own in the workplace. Many studies, in fact,
document strong, positive associations between successful diversity
strategies and support for these strategies by top management.37 The
perceived beliefs of leaders influence the beliefs of those they lead, up
and down the corporate ladder. Indeed, there is some evidence that
awareness of race and gender issues by the leadership of an
organization is a better predictor of diversity success in the
organization than a number of other possible factors, including the
race or sex of the leader.38
35. This research is reported in Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived
Consensus Influences Intergroup Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 645, 649 (2001), and Charles Stangor et al., Changing
Racial Beliefs by Providing Consensus Information, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 486, 493 (2001).
36. Among the relevant studies, see Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., Condemning and
Condoning Racism: A Social Context Approach to Interracial Settings, 79 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 993, 995 (1994); Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., Reducing the Expression of Racial
Prejudice, 2 PSYCHOL. SCI. 101, 103 (1991); Sechrist & Stangor, supra note 35, at 651;
Stangor et al., supra note 35, at 493.
37. See, e.g., E. Holly Buttner et al., The Influence of Organizational Diversity
Orientation and Leader Attitude on Diversity Activities, 18 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 356,
364, 366 (2006) (citing the importance of diversity awareness and organizational attitudes);
Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, The Architecture of Inclusion: Evidence from
Corporate Diversity Programs, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 279, 295 (2007) (“[C]ommitted
leadership, where women and minorities make it to the top ten executive positions, is
clearly important in the corporate world.”); David W. Johnson & Roger T. Johnson, The
Three Cs of Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination, in REDUCING PREJUDICE AND
DISCRIMINATION 239, 249 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000) (arguing that without strong
leadership, positive effects of contact between members of different groups is negated);
Sara Rynes & Benson Rosen, A Field Survey of Factors Affecting the Adoptions and
Perceived Success of Diversity Training, 48 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 247, 263 (1995)
(discussing generally that management’s involvement affects the adoption and perception
of diversity training); see also Dobbin & Kalev, supra, at 294 (concluding that diverse
corporate leadership at the top increases diversity through the company).
38. See, e.g., E. Holly Buttner et al., Impact of Leader Racial Attitude on Ratings of
Causes and Solutions for an Employee of Color Shortage, 73 J. BUS. ETHICS 129, 140
(2007) (summarizing survey research showing that a leader’s awareness of racial issues is
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Positive attitudes strengthen positive attitudes. Conversely,
negative attitudes will tend to reinforce negative attitudes,39 although
sometimes norm violations draw attention to the norms, and thereby
reinforce rather than weaken them. For example, when a company
that claims attachment to diversity does not appear to live by that
commitment, it may draw criticism that will strengthen the ideal of
diversity that the company has violated.40 The more diversity is
viewed cynically, however, the more likely even diversity successes
will be processed in a cynical way. When this happens, not only does
the diversity norm take a hit, but companies lose their public relations
incentive to engage in the behaviors that might otherwise be worth
showcasing.
Shin and Gulati are concerned not just about false signals, but
about harm to individuals that comes from showcasing, whether or
not a company has a true commitment to diversity. Using individual
diversity appointments to signal a diversity commitment, they argue,
amounts to treating those individuals like “prized troph[ies] . . .
valuable as an emblem of the effort required to win it, but not
something that posseses any value in itself.”41 This, Shin and Gulati
rightly point out, “is an objectionable way of regarding any person”
and “entails a failure of moral respect for those individuals.”42
The concern about dignitary harm is legitimate. It should be
weighed, of course, against the diminution of diversity appointments
that would likely result if companies receive no public relations
benefit for making such appointments. Moreover, whether dignitary
harm occurs, or at least the degree of it, depends in part on the
more strongly associated with commitment to cultural change and minority recruitment
than sex or ethnicity of the leader); Alison M. Konrad & Frank Linnehan, Formalized
HRM Structures: Coordinating Equal Employment Opportunity or Concealing
Organizational Practices?, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 787, 809 (1995) (finding that top managers’
attitudes are significant predictors of effective equal opportunity efforts); Rynes & Rosen,
supra note 37, at 263 (finding data about success of diversity training, or lack thereof,
better explained by importance of the values and beliefs of top managers than by their
gender, race, or ethnicity).
39. See Stangor et al., supra note 35, at 493.
40. A recent account of the failure of the Bloomberg administration in New York City
to appoint more women and minorities to top administrative positions is typical. The
account reports criticisms of Mayor Bloomberg’s latest round of major appointments
because all are white and all but one are male, and it also reports a concession by Mayor
Bloomberg that his administration has fallen short of achieving its diversity goals. Both the
criticisms, and Bloomberg’s response, presuppose that diversity is a positive goal, thereby
arguably reinforcing that goal. See David W. Chen & Jo Craven McGinty, Setting Diversity
as Hallmark, Mayor Falls Far Short of a Vow, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2010, at A1.
41. Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1040.
42. Id. at 1040–41.
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normative context. When showcasing occurs in a context in which
diversity is seen to be highly valued, dignitary harm should be less
than when showcasing is viewed cynically. If so, encouraging
companies to tell diversity stories that proudly link minority and
female appointments to their reputation would be more fruitful than
discouraging showcasing as opportunistic and disrespectful.
B.

Action Also Matters

Showcasing is not only an implicit expression of attitude that can
influence the attitudes of others, but it is also an action. Action taken
influences the commitment to act consistently with that action in the
future.43 Thus, like the expression of positive diversity norms, action
by company leaders—even symbolic action—has the potential to
change the attitudes of the leaders themselves, as well as those of the
people who pay attention to these leaders.
Extensive research supports the proposition that a person’s
actions influence her attitudes. One line of experimental research in
an area known as “biased scanning” suggests that the experience of
playing a particular role or advocating a particular position shifts a
person’s attitudes toward that role or position.44 For example,
students who were asked in an experimental setting to argue for a
particular position were more likely later to register more attitude
change toward that position than when they simply heard others
arguing for it.45 The more people are motivated to argue the position
or assume an assigned role, the stronger the effect. In one study,
children offered prizes to write an essay that went counter to their
attitudes about comic book characters were more likely to change
these attitudes than those who were not offered prizes.46
43. See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 1935; see also LEON PETRAZYCKI, LAW AND
MORALITY 301 (Hugh W. Babb trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1955) (n.d.) (describing the
bilateral process in which action and attitude are coordinated and reinforced).
44. See Anthony G. Greenwald, The Openmindedness of the Counterattitudinal Role
Player, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 375, 375 (1969) (finding that when study
subjects expected to have to argue later for a view contrary to their own, they tended to
shift their own attitudes in that direction); James M. Olson & Jeff Stone, The Influence of
Behavior on Attitudes, in THE HANDBOOK OF ATTITUDES 223, 224–26 (Dolores
Albarracín et al. eds., 2005) (summarizing studies on biased scanning). See generally Barry
R. Schlenker & James V. Trudeau, Impact of Self-Presentations of Private Self-Beliefs:
Effects of Prior Self-Beliefs and Misattribution, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 22
(1990) (analyzing the effect of strategic self-presentation on changes in beliefs).
45. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Rosita D. Albert, Acceptance and Recall of
Improvised Arguments, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 31, 33 (1968). This
experiment is summarized in Olson & Stone, supra note 44, at 224.
46. See Herbert C. Kelman, Attitude Change as a Function of Response Restriction, 6
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Another body of research supports the hypothesis, known as selfperception theory, that individuals infer their own attitudes and
beliefs from the same types of behavioral cues as they use in inferring
the attitudes and beliefs of others.47 Self-perception theory predicts
that people who have acted in a certain way, even if that action was
thoughtless or manipulated, are more likely to act in the future based
on the beliefs that are consistent with those actions.48 To illustrate, in
one experiment, people who had been asked to put a “be a safe
driver” sticker in a window of their home were much more likely than
others to agree subsequently to display a large, unattractive “Drive
Carefully” sign in their yard.49 People not only draw conclusions
about their own attitudes based on the actions they take, but also
draw conclusions about their motives. Research has shown, for
example, that people who are asked to do a task without any reward
are more likely to believe that the activity was a pleasurable one, and
thus are more likely to continue that activity thereafter without a
reward, than those whose initial behavior was compensated.50
Cognitive dissonance theory offers another explanation for how
actions can influence attitudes. According to cognitive dissonance
theory, when individuals experience a conflict between their actions
and attitudes, they seek to alleviate the resulting discomfort.51 One of
the ways they do so52 is to change their attitudes to conform to their
behaviors.53
HUM. REL. 185, 202 (1953). This experiment is summarized in Olson & Stone, supra note
44, at 225.
47. Olson & Stone, supra note 44, at 249–50, 253. See generally Mark P. Zanna et al.,
Self-Perception and Attitude-Behavior Consistency, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 252 (1981) (describing research showing that giving an individual the opportunity to
infer his religious attitudes based on his past participation in religious behaviors increased
the consistency between behavior and attitude).
48. Olson & Stone, supra note 44, at 249–50.
49. See Jonathan L. Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance Without Pressure: The
Foot-in-the-Door Technique, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195, 199–202 (1966).
50. See Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic
Motivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105, 109–10 (1971) (finding that when
money is used as an external reward, intrinsic motivation diminishes); Mark R. Lepper et
al., Undermining Children’s Interest with Extrinsic Reward: A Test of the
“Overjustification” Effect, 28 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 135 (1973) (finding
that children who were not rewarded for drawing pictures with magic markers drew more
pictures later during free play time than children who were initially rewarded).
51. Leon Festinger first identified cognitive dissonance theory in 1957. See generally
LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957) (setting forth the basic
theory of cognitive dissonance). Since then, cognitive dissonance theory has evolved into a
number of different sub-theories and models, described in Olson & Stone, supra note 44,
at 226–49.
52. For other ways, including reconciling their actions to conform to their attitudes, or
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These theories suggest the different mechanism by which people
may become more committed to diversity values when they act as if
they already had that commitment. Just as the repetitive participation
in religious or patriotic rituals can reinforce the belief structure
associated with those rituals,54 so also taking steps—even small,
nondeliberate ones—that presume that diversity is a positive social
goal can cause people to become more committed to that
presumption and more likely to define their world, their company,
and themselves in relation to it. This goes for leaders as well as
followers. A leader may become more committed to a position he
undertook to espouse, even if he took that position initially only for
its public relations value. Action is especially likely to have an effect
on attitudes when the attitudes initially were relatively unformed, or
ambivalent.55
Shin and Gulati have a “lingering worry”56 that justifying actions
based on the attitudes they help further has the unsavory “character
of manipulation, as of social-psychological engineering.”57 This
concern is misplaced. First, the issue raised by corporate showcasing
does not raise the usual concern about social engineering, namely,
state-imposed requirements designed to force people to conform their
attitudes to state-sponsored propaganda.58 To the contrary, corporate
staying away from situations or people who trigger the dissonance, see Olson & Stone,
supra note 44, at 227–28 (citing FESTINGER, supra note 51, at 19–22, 24, 31).
53. Olson & Stone, supra note 44, at 233, 237.
54. For two essays exploring the positive link between ritual and belief, see generally
Stephanie Kaza, Becoming a Real Person, 20 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN STUD. 45 (2000)
(explaining how Buddhist ritual reinforces Buddhist belief); Jay T. Rock, The Ongoing
Creation of Loving Community: Christian Ritual and Ethics, 20 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN
STUD. 90 (2000) (stating the same proposition in relation to Christianity).
55. See, e.g., Rob W. Holland et al., On the Nature of Attitude-Behavior Relations: The
Strong Guide, the Weak Follow, 32 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 869, 874–75 (2002) (finding
that people with weak attitudes toward Greenpeace were more affected by either donating
money (affected positively), or declining to donate money (affected negatively), to the
organization than people with strong attitudes).
56. Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1044.
57. Id.
58. This social engineering concern underlines the opposition of some people to a
wide range of government policies, such as a progressive income tax, affirmative action for
women and minorities, and restrictions on religious exercise. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 632 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (denouncing the Supreme Court’s
invalidation of a religious invocation or benediction at a public school graduation as a
form of social engineering); Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social
Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312, 1318 (1986) (arguing that affirmative action in the
electoral process on behalf of racial minorities amounts to inappropriate social
engineering); William C. Duncan, Title IX at Thirty: Unanswered Questions, 3 MARGINS
211, 228 (2003) (arguing that federal Title IX regulations are aimed at achieving social
engineering rather than opening up sports participation opportunities for women); Eric
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showcasing is an activity undertaken by a company, pursuing freely
what it perceives to be its own interests.
More to the point, the attitudinal effects of an activity are not
irrelevant to judgments about the desirability of that activity. Much of
what passes for analysis of what our laws should be—including law
and economic analysis59—turns on an evaluation of the incentives
those laws create for people to behave in certain, socially beneficial
ways. Consideration of the psychological dimensions of people’s
motivations and actions in the diversity context adds significantly to
these now-traditional forms of analysis.60 When it comes to
discrimination, indeed, noneconomic motivations are likely to be
more significant and powerful than economic ones.61 Not only is it
appropriate to take into account these noneconomic motivations, but
any analysis of what it takes to end discrimination would be
incomplete without them.
In sum, before dismissing showcasing as a disingenuous gesture
that may harm those it purports to benefit, it is necessary to consider
its positive potential to reinforce a positive view of diversity. While
the empirical basis for predicting or measuring this potential is not
fully developed, existing research suggests that such reinforcement
can be expected to better facilitate people’s internalization of
diversity values than more negative, regulatory efforts. Commitment
to diversity cannot be effectively commanded; it comes, rather,
through the absorption of community norms and expectations.
Showcasing corporate board appointments of women and minorities
is one activity through which positive community norms and
expectations about diversity can be expressed. In aligning the
company with diversity goals, showcasing reiterates the positive value
of diversity. It also constitutes action, which reinforces the positive
view of diversity upon which that action is based.

Gouvin, Radical Tax Reform, Municipal Finance, and the Conservative Agenda, 56
RUTGERS L. REV. 409, 415 (2004) (explaining conservative advocacy for a consumption
tax to replace a progressive income tax as a way to reduce opportunities for the state to
engage in social engineering).
59. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (2007)
(showing the important role of economic analysis across a variety of fields).
60. Konrad & Linnehan, supra note 38, at 807–08; see also RICHARD H. THALER &
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS 8 (2008) (drawing on psychological principles to identify governmental
policies that might facilitate improved decision making by individuals for their own
benefit).
61. See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 1904–20 (identifying the social and psychological
dimensions of race and gender bias).
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The further case for showcasing turns on the reasons why
diversity might be desirable. Part II explores the possibilities.
II. THE CASE FOR DIVERSITY
Whether showcasing serves the goal of diversity requires further
exploration of the purpose of diversity. The two reasons mentioned
most frequently in the papers to this conference are: (1) that diversity
reduces discrimination, and (2) that diversity makes “business sense,”
in terms of improved function and efficiency. This Part examines
these two rationales, including the mixed evidence pertaining to the
difference race and gender make on juries, among judges, and within
corporate boards. It then briefly considers a third alternative
mentioned in passing by Shin and Gulati—that diversity is justified by
its expressive function, as much as, or perhaps more than, its
instrumental rationales.
A.

The Discrimination and Business Rationales

The discrimination rationale assumes that women and minorities
are largely absent from corporate boards because they are the victims
of discrimination, or conditions of inequality that have accumulated
over time. The addition of women and minority members to
corporate boards helps to correct past discrimination.62 Women and
minorities might also serve as role models or help “debias” boards
and the companies they serve through contact, familiarity, and other
factors that reduce stereotypes.63 What these possible benefits have in
common is the assumption that sex and race distinctions are the
product of bias and stereotypes, not real differences.64

62. Highlighting the nondiscrimination case for diversity in this conference are Lisa
M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV.
855, 885 (2011) (“[D]iversity advocates must create a strategy that effectively incorporates
and validates moral and social justifications.”); James A. Fanto, Lawrence M. Solan &
John M. Darley, Justifying Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 901, 921, 935 (2011) (arguing
that “nondiscrimination has become a social norm in its own right,” and that diversity
“reflects and promotes antidiscriminatory norms”); Jerry Kang, The Mismatch Critique:
Comment on Fanto, Solan, and Darley, 89 N.C. L. REV. 937, 944 (2011) (“Diversity
advocates should frame rhetorically the task as one of basic justice and fairness.”).
63. See Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1044; see also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 34,
at 980–82 (citing evidence that population diversity reduces implicit bias).
64. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 999 (1988) (holding
that Title VII provides for the application of disparate impact analysis to subjective job
criteria, given the problem of subconscious racial stereotypes and prejudices); Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979) (holding as a matter of constitutional law, in the context of an
Alabama alimony statute, that sex cannot be used as a proxy for economic need).
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In contrast, the business rationale (or what I also will refer to,
interchangeably, as the diversity rationale) assumes that women and
minorities bring significant differences to corporate boards that
improve corporate performance in some measurable way.65 They may
bring talents or competencies that are not otherwise present,66 or they
may bring different life experiences or perspectives that improve
decision making or otherwise change the group dynamic in a positive
way.67 Whatever the differences might be, the business rationale
assumes that they are real and not necessarily the product of bias and
stereotypes.
Courts sometimes consider nondiscrimination and diversity as
distinct justifications; in any particular case, one may be valid while
the other is not. In the employment context, for example, the
Supreme Court on a number of occasions has held that a Title VII
claim requires proof of discrimination and that, without proof of past
discrimination, creating or maintaining diversity is an insufficient
basis for sex- and race-conscious hiring or promotion decisions.68 In
65. For the conference papers that primarily address the business case for diversity,
see generally Jennifer K. Brooke & Tom R. Tyler, Board Diversity and Corporate
Performance: A Review of the Psychological Evidence, 89 N.C. L. REV. 715 (2011); Lissa L.
Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dangerous Categories: Narratives of
Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759 (2011); Sung Hui Kim, The Diversity
Double Standard, 89 N.C. L. REV. 945 (2011).
66. See Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 65–66 (2009). This rationale, rather than the equality/justice
rationale, is reported to have been the one supporting Norway’s 2003 law that the boards
of all non-privately owned companies be comprised of at least thirty-three to fifty percent
of each gender. See id. (quoting a drafter as justifying the new law on competitive grounds,
that it would help to ensure appointing the most competent people).
67. See Karen A. Jehn et al., Why Differences Make a Difference: A Field Study of
Diversity, Conflict, and Performance in Workgroups, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 741, 756–60 (1999)
(finding that greater informational diversity leads to greater success in workgroups than
social category diversity or value diversity); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and
Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury
Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 608–09 (2006) (considering
minority impact on jury deliberations); cf. Katherine Y. Williams & Charles A. O’Reilly,
III, Demography and Diversity in Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Research, 20
RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 77, 115–17 (1998) (summarizing evidence showing the
negative effects of diversity on group communication, integration, harmony, and
efficiency).
68. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631 (1987) (holding that
affirmative action to respond to a “manifest imbalance” in traditionally sex-segregated job
categories could be justified in order to eliminate the effects of employment
discrimination, not to attain a permanently balanced workforce); Taxman v. Bd. of Educ.
of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1563 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that the layoff of a
white teacher of equal seniority to a minority teacher in order to further the school
district’s interest in maintaining racial diversity in its business education department was
unconstitutional), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997).
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contrast, in the educational context, the diversity argument has
tended to be more compelling.69
At other times, the discrimination and diversity rationales have
been drawn on simultaneously or interchangeably, as if the arguments
overlap, each filling in gaps left by the other. This blended approach
describes the defense of corporate board diversity offered by the
papers to this conference,70 and thus warrants closer examination. The
approach has been particularly evident in a pair of Supreme Court
cases establishing the importance of including minorities and women
on juries.
The race case is Batson v. Kentucky.71 In Batson, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that systematically excluding potential jurors on
account of their race implicated both (1) the “evil” of race exclusion
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to cure,72 and (2) the
right of a defendant to have a jury of peers with backgrounds
representative of his own.73 The former highlights the harm of
discrimination; the latter relies on the benefits of diversity.
The gender case is J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.74 In J.E.B., the
Supreme Court also combined discrimination and diversity rationales,
there holding that it was unconstitutional for prosecutors to use their
peremptory challenges to systematically exclude individuals from
juries because of their sex.75 Justice Blackmun reasoned that the
exclusion of women from juries was based on untrue stereotypes
about women’s differences, which the law condemns.76 Alongside that
reasoning, he also insisted that the “diverse and representative
character of the jury” was important to assure “ ‘a diffused
69. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). But see Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 722–25 (2007) (finding that a diversity
interest that is accomplished by focusing on race alone is unconstitutional and
distinguishing the diversity interests of higher educational institutions).
70. See, e.g., Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1020–21, 1024–31 (considering the
possibility that diversity is evidence of fairness and equality); id. at 1046–47 (considering
the possibility that diversity is justified by its “discourse benefits”).
71. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
72. Id. at 85.
73. Id. at 86 (holding that a defendant has a right to a jury of peers—“ ‘that is, of his
neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which
he holds’ ” (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880))).
74. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
75. Id. at 129–31.
76. Id. at 138–39 (“Respondent offers virtually no support for the conclusion that
gender alone is an accurate predictor of juror’s attitudes . . . .”); id. at 140 (reasoning that
stereotypes about women “ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities of
men and women”); see also id. at 143–45 (noting that potential jurors who are women
should be assessed on their individual characteristics rather than stereotypes).
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impartiality,’ ”77 especially “in cases where gender-related issues are
prominent, such as cases involving rape, sexual harassment, or
paternity.”78 Thus, even as the Court rejected reliance on stereotypes
in jury selection on nondiscrimination grounds, it acknowledged that
“ ‘the two sexes are not fungible’ ” and that “ ‘a community made up
exclusively of one is different from a community composed of
both.’ ”79
The blended rationales in these cases seem to offer consistent
and complementary justifications for diverse and inclusive juries.
Discrimination is wrong because the perpetuation of invidious group
stereotypes may infect the entire proceedings and lead to a loss of
confidence in the judicial systems,80 while the diversity and
representative character of the jury is necessary “ ‘as assurance of a
diffused impartiality and . . . because sharing in the administration of
justice is a phase of civic responsibility.’ ”81 In short, inclusion of
women and minorities is necessary because it is both fair and
representative.
Despite the seemingly complementary nature of these
justifications, there is also a fundamental tension between them. The
discrimination argument presupposes that race and gender are
irrelevant to juror qualifications and thus do not matter; the diversity
argument, in contrast, posits that views and contributions vary based
on race and gender, and thus that women and minorities should be
represented.82
Whether or not diversity reduces discrimination or improves the
functioning of an enterprise is an empirical question, which should be
resolvable through empirical research. The research, however, is not
clear cut. Some evidence supports the view that diversity helps to
reduce bias and stereotyping. Shin and Gulati refer to the utility of
exposure to women and minorities in providing positive role models,
or in debiasing the workplace.83 Numerous studies conclude that
77. Id. at 134 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)).
78. Id. at 140.
79. Id. at 133 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)). Ballard
held “that women may not be excluded from the venire in federal trials in States where
women were eligible for jury service under local law.” Id.; Ballard v. United States, 329
U.S. 187, 193 (1946).
80. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140.
81. Id. at 134 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1975)).
82. The concurring opinion by Justice O’Connor in J.E.B. gives more emphasis to the
relevant differences between men and women, in the context of the intrusion of the
opinion on the role of peremptory challenges in our jury system. Id. at 147–49 (O’Connor,
J., concurring).
83. Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1042–43.
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exposure to blacks and women reduces bias,84 that positive role
models make a difference,85 and that interactions between members
of different groups generate more positive attitudes between those
groups.86 However, these positive effects do not always follow. With
respect to intergroup contact, for example, it is important that
members of the different groups have equal status, common goals,
and support from leadership, and that there be interdependence
between the groups.87 Positive effects may also be limited by how
broadly the effects of an individual encounter can be generalized to
the group as a whole. It is the nature of stereotypes that they tend to
“repel disproving data,”88 often processing information that disprove
the stereotype “as an exception to a robust rule of thumb, rather than
a reason to modify the stereotype.”89 While some researchers have
focused on the potential for intergroup contact to replace existing
group boundaries and substitute a common group identity, others
have concluded that positive attitudes are best generalized to other
members of an outsider group when the salience of race or gender is
preserved, at least to some extent.90
The issue of whether diversity enhances the performance of a
group is more contested, and thus will be addressed here in more
detail. Researchers have extensively studied the impact of jury
diversity on deliberations and verdicts. Research in earlier decades
suggested that gender and race might have an impact on jury
deliberation91 and somewhat of an effect on jury verdicts.92 More
84. Bartlett, supra note 21, at 1947–53 (citing studies).
85. Id. at 1947–48.
86. Id. at 1953–54.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1949.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1954–55. For a series of essays exploring research findings relating to the
contact hypothesis, and issues still left to be explored, see generally ON THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE: FIFTY YEARS AFTER ALLPORT, supra note 34.
91. See, e.g., Catherine Kirchmeyer, Multicultural Task Groups: An Account of the
Low Contribution Level of Minorities, 24 SMALL GROUP RES. 127, 137, 142–43 (1993)
(finding that minorities contribute significantly less to decision making in small groups
than non-minorities, and that persons scoring low in masculinity traits and high in
femininity traits contribute significantly less than those scoring high in masculinity traits
and low in femininity traits); Charlan Nemeth et al., From the ’50s to the ’70s: Women in
Jury Deliberations, 39 SOCIOMETRY 293, 303 (1976) (finding in a mock jury experiment
involving a murder case that male jurors were generally perceived to be more aggressive
and confident than their female counterparts, although sex did not appear to be a factor
with respect to the verdict or persuasiveness); Fred L. Strodtbeck et al., Social Status in
Jury Deliberations, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 713, 715 (1957) (finding that men speak more
frequently than women in mock jury deliberations); see also REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE
THE JURY 140–42 (1983) (finding in one mock jury study that males initiate about forty
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recent research has confirmed some differences between men and
women in certain kinds of cases,93 as well as the likelihood that
diverse juries will deliberate longer and more thoroughly.94 In one
study, racially diverse juries spent more time deliberating than did allwhite groups and spent their time discussing a wider range of case
facts and perspectives.95 The study suggested that these effects were
not just the product of greater information exchange within members
of diverse juries, but also that whites “processed the trial information
more systematically” within diverse groups; indeed, knowing that
they were going to be deliberating with blacks appeared to cause
whites to process the information more carefully even before the
deliberations began.96
Other jury research, however, has found little or no effect
associated with gender or race. One comprehensive study based on
jury surveys in 401 actual cases in Los Angeles; the Bronx; Maricopa
County, Arizona; and the District of Columbia found no overall
difference in participation rates based on gender, and, if anything,
higher participatory rates among black jurors than those of other
racial or ethnic backgrounds.97 Far more significant appear to be
percent more comments than females, but concluding overall that there is no measurable
difference based on gender).
92. See, e.g., James H. Davis et al., Victim Consequences, Sentence Severity, and
Decision Processes in Mock Juries, 18 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
PERFORMANCE 346, 354 (1977) (finding in a mock jury study that women were more
inclined toward finding guilt in rape cases than were males); Mary A. Gowan & Raymond
A. Zimmermann, Impact of Ethnicity, Gender, and Previous Experience on Juror
Judgments in Sexual Harassment Cases, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 596, 613 (1996)
(finding that women are more likely to vote for the plaintiff in ambiguous sexual
harassment cases); Eloise C. Snyder, Sex Role Differential and Juror Decisions, 55 SOC. &
SOC. RES. 442, 444–45, 446 (1971) (finding that higher status litigants fare better before an
all-male jury than a mixed-gender jury, and that mixed-gender juries award lower damages
in civil trials); Cookie Stephan, Sex Prejudice in Jury Simulation, 88 J. PSYCHOL. 305, 308
(1974) (finding that mock jurors favored defendants of their own sex in judgments of
whether a defendant murdered his or her spouse).
93. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Golding et al., The Impact of Mock Jury Gender
Composition on Deliberations and Conviction Rates in a Child Sexual Assault Trial, 12
CHILD MALTREATMENT 182, 187 (2007) (finding in a mock jury experiment, before jury
deliberations in the case of an alleged sexual assault on a child, that men were more prodefense and women were more pro-prosecution).
94. See, e.g., Sommers, supra note 67, at 606.
95. Id. at 608.
96. Id. at 607.
97. See Erin York Cornwell & Valerie P. Hans, Contextualizing Jury Participation:
Case-, Jury-, and Juror-Level Predictors of Participation in Jury Deliberations 28–29, 33,
38 (July 30, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1441537 (finding,
overall, no difference in participation rates according to gender in a study based on jury
surveys in 401 cases in Los Angeles, the Bronx, Arizona’s Maricopa County, and the
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factors such as social class98 or whether a traditionally
underrepresented group was in the majority.99
Empirical research evaluating the difference women judges make
in the courtroom has produced similarly mixed results.100 A number
of studies have concluded that women judges bring different qualities
to the bench and are more likely to decide certain cases, such as child
support and sex discrimination, in favor of women.101 Other studies,
District of Columbia, except for in Los Angeles, where gender differences appeared to be
influenced by a higher number of Asian-American jurors, and higher participatory rates
among black jurors than those of other racial or ethnic backgrounds); see also Andrea
Hickerson & John Gastil, Assessing the Difference Critique of Deliberation: Gender,
Emotion, and the Jury Experience, 18 COMM. THEORY 281, 297 (2008) (finding “no clear
pattern of difference in the subjective assessment of jury deliberation” with regard to
gender); Erin York & Benjamin Cornwell, Status on Trial: Social Characteristics and
Influence in the Jury Room, 85 SOC. FORCES 455, 464 (2006) (finding that race and gender
are not significant indicators of influence in jury deliberations).
98. See, e.g., Cornwell & Hans, supra note 97, at 36 (noting that social class “is
increasingly the most pervasive status distinction in American society”); York & Cornwell,
supra note 97, at 464 (finding influence in jury deliberations “is conferred nearly equally
among males and females, [and among] whites and non-whites,” but influence is highly
correlated with social class).
99. See Golding et al., supra note 93, at 187 (finding that women were more likely to
change their verdict toward the prosecution in a female majority and toward the defense
in a male majority mock jury).
100. Although there have been numerous studies comparing the impact of female
judges, see infra notes 101–02, there do not appear to be comparable studies with respect
to the race of judges.
101. See, e.g., David W. Allen & Diane E. Wall, Role Orientations and Women State
Supreme Court Justices, 77 JUDICATURE 156, 161 (1993) (stating that female state
supreme court justices are more likely to support the woman’s position in cases involving
child support, sex discrimination, sexual assault, birth control, and property settlement at
divorce); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
299, 299 (2004) (finding that female judges impact their male counterparts in appellate
panel decisions concerning issues traditionally thought to be important to females);
Golding et al., supra note 93, at 182 (showing that women were more inclined to convict
than men in a mock jury experiment involving the sexual assault of a six year old child);
Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the
Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1761 (2005) (stating that female judges
support female plaintiffs more often than did male judges); Donald R. Songer et al., A
Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts of
Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425, 436 (1994) (same); Donald R. Songer & Kelly Crews-Meyer, Does
Judge Gender Matter? Decision Making in State Supreme Courts, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 750, 759
(2000) (proving that gender matters in obscenity and death penalty cases); James
Stribopoulos & Moin Yahya, Does a Judge’s Party of Appointment or Gender Matter to
Case Outcomes?: An Empirical Study of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, 45 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 315, 319 (2007) (showing in an Ontario study, female judges are more likely to
rule in favor of a female party); see also Fiona Kay & Elizabeth Gorman, Women in the
Legal Profession, 4 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 299, 321 (2008) (reporting that some studies
have shown that “female judges are more likely than their male colleagues to reach legal
conclusion that favor the interests of women”).
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including the most recent ones, have failed to confirm these
observations, or have found to the contrary.102
In trying to explain the discrepant research results on women
judges, some researchers have posited that the differences between
female and male judges are declining over time as women face less
discrimination in their lives and compete on equal playing fields with
their male counterparts.103 The decline of discrimination would
predict that qualified women and minorities would not only be more
plentiful at higher ranks as time goes on, but also, ironically, that their
presence would make less difference. Research about the interaction
effects of status and power further suggests that as race and gender
stereotypes decrease, so will the interaction patterns that are affected
by them.104
Another possible explanation for the conflicting research data is
that gender matters only, or mostly, when there is a critical mass of
women judges. Some researchers have concluded that women tend to
suppress the effects of their gender unless there is a sufficient number
of other women involved in the same enterprise. The theory here is

102. See, e.g., Christina Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54
AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 406 (2010) (finding few cases in which the gender of the judge
seemed to make a difference); Sue Davis, Do Women Judges Speak “In a Different
Voice?”: Carol Gilligan, Feminist Legal Theory, and the Ninth Circuit, 8 WIS. WOMEN’S
L.J. 143, 171 (1993) (finding no noticeable differences in the moral reasoning between
male and female judges); Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, Gender, Race, and Partisanship on
the Michigan Supreme Court, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1205, 1232 (2000) (showing that the gender
of a judge is far less significant than their political affiliation in sex discrimination and
sexual harassment cases); Jennifer A. Segal, Representative Decision Making on the
Federal Bench: Clinton’s District Court Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137, 147 (2000)
(stating that female judges appointed by Democratic presidents are not more likely than
male judges appointed by Democratic presidents to “serve the policy interests of their own
communities”); Songer et al., supra note 101, at 425 (showing that gender is insignificant in
obscenity and search and seizure cases); Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The
Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596, 607
(1985) (stating that female judges appointed by Democratic presidents are not more likely
than male judges appointed by Democratic presidents to rule for the female party in cases
involving sex discrimination, sexual harassment, maternity rights, or reproductive
freedom).
103. See Rosalind Dixon, Female Justices, Feminism, and the Politics of Judicial
Appointment: A Re-Examination, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 297, 299 (2010); Madhavi
McCall & Michael McCall, How Far Does the Gender Gap Extend?: Decision Making on
State Supreme Courts in Fourth Amendment Cases, 1980–2000, 44 SOC. SCI. J. 67, 67 (2007)
(showing that in recent years female justices have been more likely to rule in favor of
criminal defendants than male justices, but this was not true prior to 1991).
104. See generally Cecelia L. Ridgeway & Lynn Smith-Lovin, The Gender System and
Interaction, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 191 (1999) (demonstrating that research finding gender
difference in peer interactions appear to be based on cultural beliefs about the general
competence of men and women and of males’ higher status).
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that women might have differences in perspective that they are not
inclined to express without the support of other like-minded
people.105
The research with respect to the effects of diversity in corporate
boardrooms is less voluminous than the research on juries and judges,
but it is similarly mixed and inconclusive.106 These mixed results may
also be explained by generational shifts in the women and minorities
who are appointed to boards, or by factors related to critical mass.
Earlier work by Mitu Gulati and Devon Carbado107 might also
help to explain why the greater presence of women and minorities in
105. See, e.g., Boyd et al., supra note 102, at 390 (stating that “when a woman serves on
a panel with men, the men are significantly more likely to rule in favor of the rights
litigant”); Gerard S. Gryski et al., Models of State High Court Decision Making in Sex
Discrimination Cases, 48 J. POL. 143, 153 (1986) (concluding that having at least one
female member is a significant factor in whether a state high court rules in favor of a
female claimant in a sex discrimination case); Madhavi McCall, Structuring Gender’s
Impact: Judicial Voting Across Criminal Justice Cases, 36 AM. POL. RES. 264, 290 (2008)
(concluding that the number of women on the courts is a factor in judicial decision
making). See generally Farhang & Wawro, supra note 101 (exploring whether and how
racial minority and women appellate judges make a difference on issues thought to be of
particular concern to women and minorities); Peresie, supra note 101 (analyzing whether
the presence of female judges on three-judge federal appellate panels affects collegial
decision making in a subset of gender-coded cases); Stribopoulos & Yahya, supra note 101
(analyzing whether a judge’s party of appointment or gender matters to the outcome of
cases). The classic work on the difficulties of token women in all-male institutions is
ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 206–42 (1977).
More recent work on the subject includes DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE
TABLE: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE
BOARDROOM 109–19 (2007).
106. The other papers in this conference issue address the discrepancy in some detail.
See, e.g., Brooke & Tyler, supra note 65, at 719–22 (reporting studies that have found
positive links between diversity and business outcomes, and studies that do not, and
highlighting the importance of institutional context); Broome et al., supra note 65, at 765–
67 (reviewing the studies and concluding that the impact of women and minorities on
corporate boards has not been determined); Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, Corporate
Board Gender Diversity and Stock Performance: The Competence Gap or Institutional
Investor Bias?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 809, 812–13 (2011) (finding that corporate board gender
diversity does not affect firm profitability but does positively affect stock value, probably
because of institutional investor pro-gender bias); Fanto et al., supra note 62, at 902
(“[E]mpirical studies to date have not supported the case for board diversity on
shareholder value grounds.”); see also Broome et al., supra note 65, at 760–61 (finding that
interviews of forty-five corporate insiders failed to yield many examples of women and
minorities bringing different considerations to bear on board deliberation, or otherwise
making a difference); Fairfax, supra note 62, at 858–59 (finding that there are instances in
which board diversity and financial performance are linked, and others in which they are
not).
107. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate
Ladder: What Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645 (2004)
(arguing that minorities who successfully climb the corporate ladder are not likely to
racially reform the corporation, nor engage in open-door activities for the minorities at the
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corporate boardrooms has not necessarily made a difference to the
quality of board performance. This work argues that in making
diversity hires, majority decision makers will tend to choose those
female and minority candidates who are most like themselves.108
These successful women and minorities speak, move, and dress like
those who select them. They went to the same schools, joined the
same clubs, and share mutual friends. They know how to make their
race and gender invisible, and thus less threatening. Once on a board,
these individuals—so selected—continue to suppress differences in
perspective, style, or priorities that otherwise might have made a
difference to the board.109 Thus, while women and minorities might
have made a difference to the workplaces and boards they join, these
differences tend to be screened out, both before and after the
selections occur.
B.

The Expressive Function of Diversity

Given the mixed picture summarized above, one phenomenon is
striking—the broad social consensus that diversity is a good thing.
Patrick Shin argues that this consensus extends to the areas of
corporate governance, education, and employment.110 Over sixty
percent of today’s public, including sixty-six percent of people under
the age of fifty, says that the increasing racial and ethnic diversity of
the United States has been a change for the better.111 This consensus
bottom).
108. Id. at 1658, 1672–77. Selection bias, and female and minority adaptation to this
bias, flows from people’s basic psychological drive to identify most closely with, and thus
favor, those who are most like themselves. This drive has been extensively documented in
the social psychology literature. See, e.g., SAMUEL L. GAERTNER & JOHN F. DOVIDIO,
REDUCING INTERGROUP BIAS: THE COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL 36–39 (2000);
Marilynn B. Brewer, The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?, 55 J.
SOC. ISSUES 429, 430 (1999).
109. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 107, at 1677–90.
110. Patrick S. Shin, Diversity v. Colorblindness, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1175, 1190; see also
Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J.
SOC. 1589, 1609–15 (2001) (tracing the rise of pro-diversity rhetoric in organizational
management literature and education from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s); Erin Kelly &
Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management: Employer
Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to 1996, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 960, 966–71
(1998) (documenting growth in corporate diversity strategies, even in periods when equal
opportunity laws were not vigorously enforced); Daniel N. Lipson, Embracing Diversity:
The Institutionalization of Affirmative Action as Diversity Management at UC-Berkeley,
UT-Austin, and UW-Madison, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 985, 1020 (2007) (documenting
consensus of administrators at three elite universities in favor of race-based affirmative
action, despite some legal resistance).
111. News Release, The Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Current
Decade Rated as Worst in 50 Years: Internet, Cell Phones are Changes for the Better 9
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is reflected at this conference on corporate board diversity, where the
question is not whether appointment of women and minorities to
corporate boards is justified, but rather on what grounds the case for
board diversity can be most credibly based.112
This preference for diversity, however, is characterized by some
ambiguity and ambivalence. Just as the Supreme Court’s defense of
diversity on juries hedges between the relevance and irrelevance of
race and gender, people support diversity based on a blend of
nondiscrimination and diversity rationales that rest on contradictory
premises. They reject stereotype-based discrimination, while also
valuing diversity based on generalizations that amount to stereotypes.
Even as they prefer diversity, people are often offended by the raceand gender-specific measures that would be necessary to bring it
about.113 When they do engage in race- and gender-specific measures,
the impulse is to replicate themselves insofar as possible, rather than
risk stepping outside their own comfort zones.114
Shin and Gulati mention, although they do not rely upon, an
understanding of diversity that helps to transcend these contradictory
impulses. This understanding is that diversity is “constitutive of the
good of a community” and expresses the commitment toward “a
certain ideal of justice or equality.”115 Within this view, diversity is a
political and emotional vision of the kind of society in which people
want to live. This vision rests on a societal ideal of heterogeneity. It
posits and affirms a collective and individual identity in which women

(Dec. 21, 2009), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/573.pdf; see also Broome et al., supra
note 65, at 805 (“[A]ll of our interview subjects . . . agree with the abstract proposition that
board diversity is a good thing.”).
112. See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 62, at 858–59 (highlighting that economic- and
market-based rationales for board diversity are not enough and that “moral and social
justifications” must still be taken into account); Fanto et al., supra note 62, at 906 (arguing
that “diversity advocates should continue to offer different normative frameworks other
than finance-based shareholder value to justify board diversity”).
113. Survey studies show that a majority of Americans, including women and people of
color, are averse to identity-conscious diversity strategies. See, e.g., Alison M. Konrad &
Frank Linnehan, Race and Sex Differences in Line Managers’ Reactions to Equal
Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action Interventions, 20 GROUP & ORG.
MGMT. 409, 428 (1995) (drawing conclusions based on interviews of line managers at four
large companies). This aversion to identity-based strategies is well-represented on the
current Supreme Court. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.”). For a full and critical discussion of the various
rationales for colorblindness, see Shin, supra note 110, at 1215–18.
114. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 107, at 1658.
115. Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1020–21. For further exploration of this rationale,
see Shin, supra note 110, at 1190.
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and minorities can and do succeed.116 Because this understanding
attaches to the norm rather than to an instrumental goal, it does not
depend upon empirical evidence showing that it accomplishes a given
purpose. Indeed, it is relatively indifferent to whether diversity is
required to end discrimination, or to provide a full range of
perspectives to a group and thus greater productivity. Either is
possible, but neither is necessary. For people to feel best about
themselves and the society in which they live, it is enough that
opportunity appears, at least, to have been fairly distributed.
Part III sketches the implications of this expressive rationale for
the showcasing debate.
III. THE POSITIVE CASE FOR SHOWCASING
If the real rationale for diversity appointments is the aspiration it
expresses, showcasing serves the function of feeding people’s desire
to be affirmed in this aspiration. Showcasing reflects their individual
and collective self-image of a fair and diverse society. Seeing proof of
progress toward that ideal helps people to continue to believe in its
possibility and thus be more committed to it.
There are reasons to be cynical. As others have observed,
highlighting the visible “proof” of the success of some women and
minorities can be self-deluding, obscuring the deeper, less diverse
reality of a society stratified by race and gender.117 We are not likely
to achieve race and gender equality if we fool ourselves into thinking
we already have it. Why make people feel good about superficial
achievements that mask continued race and gender privilege? Selfdelusion and ignorance are not promising conditions for a genuinely
diverse and inclusive society.

116. And they suffer, collectively, when those women and minorities who seemed to
represent success, fail. A notable example of both is Tiger Woods. His success was proof
that people of mixed race could succeed in America; because of the importance of this
reassurance, his reputational hit following disclosures of several extramarital affairs was
arguably out of proportion to the seriousness of those disclosures. See Tiger Woods
POST
(Dec.
28,
2009),
Scandal:
$12
Billion
Fallout?,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/28/tiger-woods-scandal-12-bi_n_405228.html.
117. See, e.g., Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does
Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1053–
54 (2009) (opposing focus on unconscious bias because it deludes people into thinking that
conscious racism has disappeared, which it has not); Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious
Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of “The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection,” 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 942 (2008) (arguing that attention needs to focus on
the ideology and material structures of white supremacy).
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And yet, as we think pragmatically about how to achieve a more
genuinely diverse and inclusive society, the positive affirmation of the
value of diversity seems more productive than the cynical view of it.
Affirmation reinforces and perpetuates the positive, and allows
people to deepen their commitments to those norms freely, in a way
that motivates and sustains nondiscriminatory, inclusive behaviors.118
In contrast, coercion and shame tend to create anxiety, distance, and
resentment—all emotions that work against the internalization of the
desired norms.119 This is not to say that law should be abandoned;
legal norms about nondiscrimination are necessary and should be
clear, consistent, enforced, and modeled by respected leaders.120 That
said, where actions—like showcasing—are ambiguous, a positive
construction of those actions may better serve the goal of
nondiscrimination and diversity than one that assumes the worst.
Shin and Gulati criticize an “inside-out” approach to diversity
because they say it assumes that change will come from wellintentioned decision making.121 They contrast this approach to what
they believe is a more plausible, “outside-in” approach, whereby
diversity comes first, mandated if necessary, and then becomes a
means by which implicit bias is eliminated.122
The dichotomy they propose is a false one. The changes
necessary to create a diverse and inclusive workplace are a product of
complex interactions between external and internal norms, laws and
voluntary action, structural and institutional barriers, and informal
contact and friendships.123 The achievement of a diverse and inclusive
workplace does not start either from purely voluntary, good
intentions, or by legal mandate. It is, instead, the product of an
ongoing synthesis of many dynamic influences and processes.124 Most
people hold contradictory ideals, not easily susceptible to either easy
reconciliation or rapid, permanent change. Within this complex
reality, change does not come solely from within, or from without, but
from ongoing, evolving resolutions of people’s conflicting principles.
If this more dialectic model is accurate, company showcasing for
the purpose of sending a positive message about the company is not
118. See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 1901, 1960–67, 1970–71.
119. Id. at 1966–67.
120. Id. at 1970.
121. Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1051.
122. Id. at 1051–53.
123. See generally Bartlett, supra note 21 (arguing that positive affirmation of the
values of diversity is a more productive way to instill a strong commitment to
nondiscriminatory norms than strengthening the antidiscrimination laws).
124. Id. at 1941–56.
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necessarily “corrosive” of diversity values, despite the potential
dangers Shin and Gulati outline. Positive messages must be in the
mix, along with ongoing reality checks. So are companies who are
proud to have added more women and minorities to the organization
in top places—even if those additions do not always reflect a deep or
mature understanding of what a true commitment to diversity
requires.
It goes without saying that showcasing, in itself, is not enough.
Far from it. To achieve diversity, companies need comprehensive,
integrated, long-term policies, not single-shot, superficial actions.125
But showcasing is one piece of a larger network of practices that can
positively affect attitudes and expectations. Shin and Gulati do not
give us good enough reasons to stamp it out.

125. Id. at 1960–71.

